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Abstract
The international response to the crisis in Libya has been remarkably quick and decisive. Where many 
other cases of mass atrocity crimes have failed to generate sufficient and timely political will to 
protect civilians at risk, the early response to Libya in 2011 has shown that the United Nations 
Security Council is able to give effect to the ‘responsibility to protect’ norm. While not an 
implementing party in a legal sense, the Australian government has taken a forward-leaning 
diplomatic stance in helping to mobilise broad support for addressing this crisis. In light of the on-
going political controversy over armed humanitarian intervention, the Libya case shows that state-
based advocacy for R2P matters, given the on-going need to bolster the legitimacy of the principle. A 
discussion of Canberra’s diplomatic activity is a prelude to an examination of the proceedings of the 
UN Security Council and the two key resolutions, the second of which gave effect to the forcible 
action. The article then considers three dimensions of the Security Council’s implementation of the 
responsibility to protect: the language of the resolutions and the intriguing absence of a textual 
reference to the international community’s responsibility to act; the expansive mandate for civilian 
protection in Security Council resolution 1973; and the first unanimous referral to the International 
Criminal Court, with novel support from the United States of America. 
The terroristic use of state power turns a classic civil war into mass murder. If there is no 
other way out, democratic neighbour states have to intervene in an emergency based on a 
legitimisation by international law (Habermas 1999).
Liberal justifications for a ‘humanitarian war’ … construct an inherently problematic link 
between military means and humanitarian ends. […]  The West was neither willing to risk 
the lives of its own soldiers nor to bear the burden of shedding others’ blood, a burden the 
waging of war necessarily entails (Barkawi 2000).
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Arguments for and against  humanitarian intervention – such as those embodied in the quotations 
above – are currently being debated in the global media. These particular statements were made in 
relation to the Kosovo War, serving as a reminder that, despite the consolidation of the responsibility 
to protect  norm in the UN system during the post-Kosovo period, the application of military power for 
humanitarian ends remains a divisive ethical and political question.  
The sight of attack aircraft  targeting Libyan command and control facilities triggered a 
barrage of criticisms by anti-interventionist commentators and state leaders. For them, Operation 
Odyssey Dawn did not look, resemble, or feel, like humanitarian protection. Rather, it reminded them 
of the worst  aspects of Operation Allied Force twelve years previously – a lengthy air campaign to 
degrade a vastly weaker opponent’s political and military infrastructure, accompanied by political 
disunity over both the mandate and strategic disagreements about  targeting. The inherently 
problematic link between military means and humanitarian ends – noted by Barkawi - is as evident 
today as it was in the 1999. 
Despite the challenges presented by the intervention agenda the Australian government in the 
post-Cold War period has not  wavered in its longstanding view, encapsulated nicely by Habermas 
during the Kosovo War, that  states have a duty to intervene when citizens elsewhere are in mortal 
danger. Over Libya, Australia has adopted a pro-intervention policy that has been, in the words of one 
official, ‘early, clear, and consistent’. Sceptics – those who Habermas described as having a 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ – could argue that it  is easy to be in favour of a high risk policy response 
when the stakes were so low for Australia. It  is true that  no military assets have been deployed by 
Australia and no significant trade or security interests are at risk as a result of the action. Yet such a 
crude conjunction of material interests with policy take-up is unsatisfactory. As we argue below, 
Canberra’s championing of responsibility to protect  (R2P) in relation to Libya is only intelligible 
against the backdrop of a long standing commitment on the part  of several Australian foreign 
ministers to the evolution and consolidation of these norms (Bellamy 2010a). 
The article opens by considering the diplomatic moves made by Foreign Affairs Minister 
Kevin Rudd and the impact he exerted on international policy formulation. This is manifestly not  a 
narrative about ‘Rudd’s War’ for the same reasons that  Kosovo was not  ‘Blair’s War’, despite attempts 
by journalists to make such outlandish claims. Such exaggerations do not  go unnoticed. When the 
former British Prime Minister was in the United States during the Kosovo War, making the case for a 
ground invasion, the influential conservative foreign affairs commentator, Patrick J. Buchanan, asked 
whether ‘the mouse had roared’?  To which he added pithily, ‘it isn't  going to be British troops 
humping up the road to Belgrade’. There is clearly a serious point underlying Buchanan’s objection 
and that  is the tendency for those who agitate for military action to confuse generalized 
responsibilities with the disproportionate burden that  falls on those who have the capability to act. At 
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the same time, it is neither defensible on moral or analytical grounds to treat  humanitarian 
intervention as though it was the sole prerogative of the great powers.  
What  we present  in the first  part of the article is a parallel narrative about the take-up of R2P 
in relation to Libya. We look at the agential capacity of a state-based actor – Australia – that is 
structurally located outside the UN Security Council and has a limited range of tools it  can pull out of 
the foreign policy ‘box’. At the same time, there is a significant focus on what  went on inside the 
chamber of the Security Council, the institution that  has authority for authorizing measures to 
maintain global peace and security.  What brings these two narratives together is not a neat and tidy 
causal story in which the Foreign Minister’s ‘words’ trigger international ‘deeds’. The social world 
does not work this way. What unifies Australia and the Security Council’s deliberations over Libya is 
the importance of establishing the legitimating principle that  is required for intervention. R2P is a 
principle that legitimates coercive measures to be taken, as a last resort, to protect peoples at  risk from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Through its unstinting support 
for R2P, Australian foreign policy has become one of the ‘enabling conditions’ for the elaboration of 
new international rules authorizing intervention (Skinner 2002: 156).
The second part  of the article picks up the Libya story as debated in the Security Council in 
New York. While Australia has been part  of the enabling condition for the consensus that exists 
around R2P in broad terms, it is in the Security Council where its applicability is tested.[1] Here we 
see how the meaning and use of R2P is debated and contested, or in Quentin Skinner’s words, ‘how 
far these [meanings] can be plausibly stretched’ (2002: 156). We argue that  the multilateral 
deliberations of the Security Council involved considerable stretching in relation to previous 
articulations of R2P. This makes our position different to that  of Simon Chesterman (2011), a 
respected writer on international law in the UN system, who broadly argues that Libya is significant 
only from a political and not  from a legal perspective.[2] The concluding discussion asks what impact 
Libya is likely to have on the diplomacy of responsibility. While we concur with those who argue 
regional organizations are exerting greater influence, this case study shows that state-based advocacy 
and activism – bilaterally and multilaterally - remains important to the legitimation of R2P. 
Australia’s R2P Activism
Libya was not  Australia’s humanitarian intervention moment. [3] That came in September 1999 when 
Australian defence forces intervened to prevent pro-Jakarta militias from over-turning the outcome of 
the vote on the self-determination of Timor Leste. Of course it  could be argued that this was not a real 
case of humanitarian intervention as a functioning government  in Indonesia did not  oppose the 
INTERFET operation (Cotton 2001; Wheeler and Dunne 2001). Yet the reality was that  many doubted 
the extent to which there was effective control over the Indonesian military, particularly given their 
known opposition to East Timorese independence. Whichever side of this debate one takes over 
whether this was in fact a case of humanitarian intervention, the key point was that the Australian 
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government was prepared to take significant  risks in relation to its military personnel in order to 
underwrite the outcome of a ballot on regime change.
Tracking Australia’s diplomatic initiatives in relation to Libya is intelligible only in relation to 
the longstanding commitment  the country has made to the R2P principle, despite objections to it  - and 
frequent  abuses of it - by various governments around the world. Championing the principle, as many 
countries have done often in concert  with NGOs and international organizations, has been critical to 
the legitimacy it has acquired in contemporary international society (Wheeler 2000).
R2P and Ideological Innovation
The German social theorist  Max Weber described social actors that challenge the prevailing consensus 
as ‘ideological innovators’ (Skinner, 2002: 148).[4] The innovation stage of R2P within international 
politics took off in 1999 when Kofi Annan reflected on the problems of both inaction in Rwanda and 
unlawful action on Kosovo (Annan 1999). The International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) was created to find a solution to these tensions, co-chaired by Australia’s former 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Gareth Evans. The ICISS produced a report  titled ‘the responsibility to 
protect’ which outlined thresholds of suffering beyond which the norm of non-intervention would give 
way to the exercise of international responsibilities (ICISS: xi). Through an intensive process of 
advocacy these ideas were distilled into the 2005 World Summit outcome document, which outlined 
national and international responsibilities to take ‘timely and decisive action’ – on a case by case basis 
- in response to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against  humanity (United Nations 
General Assembly 2005). After being endorsed in 2005 R2P moved into the consolidation phase 
where it has become a regular part  of discussions within the United Nations (see Bellamy 2010b). In 
2006 the Security Council reaffirmed both paragraphs of R2P (see resolution 1674). 
In light of the broad acceptance of the R2P principle in international society, Australia’s 
diplomacy shifted from the role of ideological innovator to that  of being a tenacious advocate of its 
applicability. Australia has recently created the senior governmental position of ‘National R2P 
Coordinator’ and has been a strong promoter of R2P (see Rudd 2011d). Foreign Affair Minister Kevin 
Rudd has been tireless, to the point of criticism from conservative quarters, in his support for R2P and 
its application. 
If we doubt that advocacy matters, consider the views of Anthony Lake, national security 
advisor to President Clinton during the Rwandan genocide: in Lake’s words ‘it  was seen as impossible 
to contemplate American intervention, because nobody was for it’ (cited in Barnett 2008: 198-9). A 
looming humanitarian catastrophe seventeen years later, on the African continent, did not meet with 
the same international indifference. 
It  is important  to reflect  carefully on what is, and is not, being claimed when R2P is said to be 
an international ‘norm’. Given the structural weaknesses in international society around collective 
action, no norm in relation to the use of force is sufficiently robust  that it  will be applied consistently. 
Once the standard claim about how norms work is turned on its head, we get a better understanding of 
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R2P: it  has made non-intervention in the face of mass atrocity crimes less likely. The legitimacy 
accorded to R2P is sufficiently broad and deep to mean that  it is more difficult  for states to continue 
with ‘business as usual’ when mass atrocity crimes are occurring.[5]
Rudd’s Diplomatic Activism
The uprising in Libya began shortly after the fall of Tunisian ex-President Ben Ali on 14 February 
2011 after 23 years in power. While the people celebrated, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi expressed 
regret  about  the regime change in Tunisia, saying ‘there was no one better’ than Ben Ali. The social 
revolution of the Arab Spring soon spread to Libya. A week after the uprising began, and with the 
government crackdown gathering momentum, Kevin Rudd made a strong statement  on ABC radio 
lending his support to the aspirations of protestors for freedom from repression and the right  to live a 
better life (Rudd 2011a). He stopped short, at  this early stage, of explicitly invoking ‘pillar three’ 
responsibilities as set out in paragraph 139 of the World Summit document.
The League of Arab States (LAS) suspended Libya from the organization on 22 February 
2011; the first  indication of the critical role that regional organisations were to play in the response to 
the crisis. On the same day, the UN Security Council issued a statement calling for the Libyan 
government ‘to meet its responsibility to protect  its population’ (United Nations Security Council 
2011a). This was an unusually quick response from the Security Council only a week into the crisis.    
It  was in the days immediately following that Australia sought  to leverage its diplomatic 
influence through its strong bilateral relations with permanent  Security Council members (P5), as well 
as through direct membership of bodies such as the Human Rights Council. In advance of the Special 
Session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, the Foreign Minster urged the Council ‘to pursue its 
mandate to send a strong message to the Gaddafi regime that  violations of human rights will not be 
tolerated’. Later in the same statement, Rudd reminded his audience that  every sovereign state, and 
the international community as a whole, had ‘a responsibility to protect  civilian populations from 
mass atrocities, including crimes against  humanity’ (2011c). This was the first intervention by Rudd 
that urged the Security Council to consider a range of coercive measures, including the 
implementation of a no-fly zone. He also wrote to Brazil as the President  of the Security Council for 
February to urge them to use their presidency to push for stronger action on Libya.  
The day after the Human Rights Council meeting, at  which every member-state severely 
criticised the Gaddafi regime, Australia imposed sanctions on 22 members of the regime including the 
ruling family (prohibiting Australians from engaging in financial transactions with the named 
individuals). While not  wanting to over-state the material effects of this policy, this unilateral decision 
by the government of Australia demonstrated their willingness to take practical measures against the 
government of Libya. On the same tack, Australia made a significant  humanitarian material 
contribution to the crisis by being the third largest donor of humanitarian aid.
While in Geneva, Rudd met with Catherine Ashton (EU High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs) and her senior advisor Robert Cooper. Previously, Cooper had played an important role in 
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advocating an internationalist  position to Tony Blair during the first of his Labour administrations. 
Reflecting on Rudd’s impact  in relation to Libya, Cooper noted that ‘voices from different parts can 
sometimes have more influence than one imagines’ (cited in Stewart 2011).
Here and elsewhere, the diplomacy of responsibility conducted by Canberra is a good 
illustration of the effective mobilization of soft power. For reasons of geography and scale, Australia 
was not in a position to join the military action – though some deployment  might  have been possible 
without  Canberra’s significant  contribution to the International Security Assistance Force in 
Afghanistan. But what  Australia achieved was that it helped to securitise the case: this entailed the 
following three moves (i) shifting the importance of Libya up the international agenda (ii) 
highlighting the need for decisive action to be taken by the UNSC (iii) justifying coercion on the 
exceptional grounds of the international community’s duties to assist  and protect  peoples in Eastern 
Libya facing mortal danger. 
Australia played an active role in lobbying relevant  regional bodies to promote a strong stance 
on Libya. In early March Rudd met  with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to discuss the 
possibility of a no-fly zone in Libya. A senior DFAT official indicated that Australia was very strongly 
advocating a no-fly zone to the OIC at this time (interview 2011). Rudd met  again with the OIC’s 
Secretary General on the 8th of March, the day the OIC announced support  for a no-fly zone in Libya. 
The following day Australia and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) 
issued a joint  statement calling for the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone on Libya. This 
was indicative of Australia’s ‘forward leaning’ stance on Libya as a promoter of R2P. 
How much should be made of Australia’s stance on Libya and R2P in light  of the current bid 
for a non-permanent  seat on the UN Security Council for 2013-2014? DFAT’s website lists the 
promotion of R2P as a key element in Australia’s bid. A senior DFAT official maintained, however, 
that generating support  for Australia’s bid was never a consideration in formulating policy on Libya; 
rather, he took the view that  activism on Libya was an extension of Australia’s stance on human rights 
internationally and it  was a question of ‘values’ (interview 2011). Rather than viewing Australia’s 
advocacy on Libya and R2P as related to the Security Council bid, it  is possible to see support for 
multilateralism and the value placed on responsible sovereignty as reasons for aspiring to a rotating 
seat on the Council and championing human rights in Libya (Bellamy 2010a). 
Advocacy amid Discord 
The consensus on R2P that  was forged in the post-Kosovo decade does not  mean that unity is assured 
when it is applied to individual cases. Such ambiguity is evident  in Resolution 1973. R2P is only 
invoked in relation to ‘the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect  the Libyan 
population’ (emphasis added), despite the fact that Libya had not been exercising sovereignty-as-
responsibility for the period of Gaddafi’s long rule. The point of 1973 of course was that Libya was 
not going to be trusted to show restraint, and therefore timely and decisive action (pillar three), was 
going to be required.
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Why, then, did the Security Council chose to give effect to a pillar three intervention while 
presenting the rationale in pillar one terms?  One possible answer can be found by tracking back to 
Darfur. Here Resolution 1706 was more consistent in that  it recalled both paragraphs 138 and 139 of 
the 2005 World Summit  outcome document:  in other words, it invoked pillar three while seeking to 
give effect to it. Consistent it  might  have been, contentious it most certainly was. According to a US 
State Department  official, the inclusion of the international community’s responsibility to protect 
came at the cost of other parts of the resolution (interview 2011).[6]
While P5 members have been willing to make a pillar three argument  on Libya in some 
settings, no permanent member used pillar three language to frame resolution 1973 when speaking at 
the vote. The only Security Council member to do this was Colombia which stated that  the Libyan 
government ‘has shown that it is not up to the international responsibility of protecting its 
population’ (2011d). France used strong pillar three language after the vote for resolution 1970, but 
not 1973, saying that  the text ‘recalls the responsibility of each State to protect its own population and 
of the international community to intervene when States fail in their duty’ (2011b). Given these pillar 
three statements from Security Council members on the situation in Libya, it is intriguing that  no P5 
member included reference to this in their statements on resolution 1973 as being an instance of pillar 
three implementation. 
The attachment of R2P to Libya’s responsibilities as a sovereign state, rather than explicitly 
invoking the international community’s collective responsibility, is a good example of how the 
application of the R2P principle remains controversial and contested. It is against  this backdrop that 
we should understand the importance of consistent  R2P  advocacy – including the generalised 
responsibilities that accrue to the society of states – by countries like Australia. Absent  this wider 
legitimacy, the struggle over the meaning and implementation of R2P in New York would probably 
have resulted in a diplomatic stalemate.
The UN Security Council’s response to the crisis in Libya
The UN Security Council issued three key statements which show the evolution of its stance on Libya 
in the lead-up to NATO’s intervention. With increasing escalation, these were a non-binding press 
statement on 22 February, followed by two resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
on 26 February and 17 March. Taken together these actions show a response from the Security 
Council that is noteworthy for its speed, expansive no-fly zone mandate, and changed politics toward 
the International Criminal Court  (ICC). Ambassador Rice stated on Libya ‘I can’t  remember a time in 
recent  memory when the Council has acted so swiftly, so decisively, and in unanimity on an urgent 
matter of international human rights’ (2011a). 
Security Council resolution 1973: an expansive mandate?
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Resolution 1973 must be viewed in the context of the normative development of R2P and the 
protection of civilians since the end of the Cold War. Many aspects of this resolution are unique and 
reflect the difficult  lessons learnt during this period. Resolution 1973 is the first no-fly zone explicitly 
authorised for civilian protection purposes and the language used to do this is more expansive than 
prior examples. However, abstentions from two permanent members and other rising states suggest 
that while a shift is evident it is not without contestation. 
Resolution 1973 mandates a no-fly zone which is a rare measure for the Security Council to 
use. Two previous cases involving the use of no-fly zones are pertinent here, Iraq in 1991 and Bosnia 
in 1992. The Security Council has built  on the lessons learned from prior cases to create a mandate 
which is both legally authorised and explicit  about its civilian protection goals. Resolution 688 on Iraq 
was used to justify the subsequent no-fly zones, but  there is no explicit reference to this in the text 
(Wheeler 2000: 152). In fact, the only time the Security Council had previously explicitly authorised a 
no-fly zone was in Bosnia, but this resolution was justified as necessary for the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, rather than for the protection of civilians (United Nations Security Council 1992). 
In contrast  to these prior examples, resolution 1973 on Libya is the first time the Security Council has 
authorised a no-fly zone with the explicit purpose of protecting civilians. 
In deliberations of the Security Council, the use of ‘previously agreed language’ is valued by 
practitioners because it  is easier to find consensus for. So much so that the Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs produces an ‘Aide Memoire’ which includes a selection of language on 
protection as a tool to assist the Security Council draft  resolutions (OCHA 2011). In Resolution 1973 
prior wording on the civilian protection is stretched to both draw on previous agreements and take 
them a step further. The standard language used in resolutions is to ‘protect  civilians under imminent 
threat of physical violence’ which is notable for how consistently it  is used (Holt, Taylor & Kelly 
2009). In contrast, 1973 uses the phrase ‘to protect  civilians and civilian populated areas under threat 
of attack’, dropping the word ‘imminent’ and including a more expansive concept  of ‘civilian 
populated areas’. As Schmitt  outlines, the inclusion of ‘civilian populated areas’ means that areas can 
be defended beyond those where civilians are in immediate danger (2011: 56). The civilian protection 
component  of this resolution shows a more expansive approach to the protection of civilians in both 
actions and language. 
These expansions are not uncontroversial. Abstentions in Security Council are uncommon and 
a strong statement  of dissent  given that  between 2000 and 2010 more than 91% of Security Council 
resolutions were passed with the affirmative votes of all fifteen members.[7] Yet  a third of Security 
Council members abstained on Resolution 1973 highlighting the controversial nature of this decision. 
More significant than the number of the abstentions however is who abstained on this resolution. The 
states that  abstained on this resolution were Brazil, Russia, India, China and Germany. This means 
that none of the four BRIC countries [8] (two with a Security Council veto and two as ordinary 
members on a rotational basis) were prepared to support  the mission. Their scepticism over the use of 
force in Libya raises important questions about the will and the capacity of emerging powers for 
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taking ‘timely and decisive action’ to prevent humanitarian disasters or mitigate their worst effects. 
The main reasons cited by these members on why they abstained from the vote were twofold: they 
believed the mission had a low chance of success and they were concerned about the indeterminacy of 
the resolution that was in front of them  (2011c).
  Although the abstentions on resolution 1973 indicate the contentious nature of this decision, 
this must be tempered by the fact  that it was not contentious enough to provoke a veto from a 
permanent member. Even though they abstained, Russia and China chose not to veto the resolution or 
to campaign such that  there was an insufficient majority in favour. Both veto powers cited the support 
of the Arab League of States for implementing a no-fly zone as key to their decision to abstain rather 
than veto, with Russia highlighting the importance of civilian protection as a further reason (2011c). 
In this respect, the phrase ‘constructive abstention’ [9] captures the China and Russian position over 
resolution 1973 – a markedly different outcome to the diplomatic opposition they mounted against 
attempts to secure Security Council authorization for the Kosovo intervention in 1999. 
The International Criminal Court
Resolution 1970 is only the second time the Security Council has asked the ICC to investigate a 
situation. As such it  is informative to consider the Libyan case in light  of the Council’s prior referral 
of Darfur in 2005 to show how the politics surrounding the ICC are different in these two cases. 
The unity expressed in the 15-0 vote by members of the Security Council is the first  major 
difference. Other points of note are the speed with which the Security Council referred the matter of 
Libya to the ICC; less than two weeks into the Libyan conflict  and more than two years into the 
Darfur crisis. Also, the Darfur referral was triggered by an International Commission of Inquiry (see 
Schabas 2010) whereas the ICC was asked to investigate Libya without a prior judicial endorsement.
Although the membership of the Security Council in 2011 includes five non-signatories to the 
Rome Statute all five voted in favour of referring the situation of Libya to the ICC. The non-
signatories either expressed strong support  or raised concerns but voted affirmatively because of Arab 
and African support for the referral (United Nations  Security Council 2011d). Brazil, a strong 
supporter of the ICC, voiced the same concerns over the caveats in the texts of both referrals, but 
abstained on Darfur and voted in favour of the Libyan referral because of ‘the urgent  need for the 
Council to send a strong, unified message’ suggesting a strong pull towards unanimity (United 
Nations Security Council 2011d). 
The shift  in position by the United States on the ICC merits further discussion. After 
abstaining on the Darfur referral, United States Ambassador Patterson reminded the world that  ‘we 
have not dropped, and indeed continue to maintain, our long-standing and firm objections and 
concerns regarding the ICC’ (United Nations Security Council 2005). On Libya the United States not 
only voted in favour of the referral of Libya to the ICC it went as far as to co-sponsor the resolution. 
Here we have a somewhat  unlikely situation of the United States putting forward a resolution to the 
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Security Council in support of a referral to a court  that  it  had insisted its military personnel and 
political elite are immune from. 
Both resolutions on Libya show that current debates on R2P in the Council are about the 
implementation of R2P, rather than the appropriateness of the norm. The Russian view nicely 
illustrates the legitimacy that  is now accorded to the principle that  ‘timely and decisive action’ is 
acceptable under certain circumstances. At one point  during the diplomatic debate, Russia’s view was 
that the most  effective way to protect Libyan civilians was by demanding an immediate cease-fire 
rather than through a no-fly zone (United Nations Security Council 2011d). Here we see a non liberal 
great power contesting the means rather than the ends of protective intervention. 
Conclusions: Libya’s Legacy
It  is a truism, though an important one nonetheless, that the state of intervention in international 
society will greatly depend on whether Libya is seen as a successful operation. The no-fly zone 
and other punitive sanctions have been in place now for five months and the regime does not 
appear to be on the brink. The best  that  can be said at the moment is that the UN mandated 
measures have curbed Libyan state terror and levelled the balance of forces between the regime 
and the opposition. Yet the spectre of Kosovo remains in terms of a mismatch between the 
protection of civilians mandate and the declared aim – of the intervening states - to remove 
Gaddafi from power. As uncomfortable as it may sound, R2P advocates have said all along that 
there is nothing in the doctrine that  guarantees a successful outcome either in the military phase of 
the operation or in the institution-building that follows the intervention. 
The focus of the article has not been an evaluation of the impact  of the two UN 
resolutions. Rather, we have sought  to ask what the Libya case tells us about  the state of 
intervention? Initial commentaries have highlighted the potential leadership deficit in a post-
American world. An article in Foreign Policy expresses this viewpoint  nicely: ‘there will always 
be crises that require multilateral action’ and this stark reality opens up the question ‘when the 
BRICS [11] will be willing to step up to the plate and place idealism above self-interest’ (Wagner 
and Jackman 2011). The reasons for BRIC caution in relation to 1973 are multiple and include 
reasonable concerns about the efficacy of force and a likely gap between the political intent and 
the kind of military actions that were suitable. 
Many commentators in late February and early March believed that a Security Council 
agreement  on coercive military action would never be forthcoming. Various factors lessened the 
opposition of Russia and China, including a worsening of the terror being perpetrated by Gaddafi’s 
military supporters, to the point  where the veto-casting members of the BRIC coalition effectively 
enabled Resolution 1973 by not opposing it (either through casting the veto or by mobilizing 
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opinion of non-permanent members against the Resolution, as France and Russia did in March 
2003 over Iraq).
 A factor that  was critical to the tipping of the balance in favour of military action on the 
part of the United States was the degree to which a coercive response was supported by regional 
organizations. Secretary of State Clinton spoke about  the leadership and conviction evident in the 
League of Arab State declaration of 12 March 2011 that  called for both a no-fly zone and the 
establishment of safe areas. In tracking this development, Bellamy and Williams have gone as far 
as to suggest that regional organizations are playing an ‘emerging gatekeeper role’ (2011: 867). 
While the prominence of regional organizations has become an important focal point for 
discussion, this article is a reminder about the on-going importance of states acting as R2P champions. 
As we recorded earlier on in the article, Australia diplomatic support  position in relation to decisive 
action against Libya was ‘early, clear and consistent’. With no clear national interests at stake and no 
hard power to reinforce its diplomatic message, Australia nevertheless mobilised significant 
normative power, reserves of which have been built-up over many years of R2P  activism. It is the 
long-standing bolstering of the principle of R2P by Australia (in concert  with other pro-R2P  states and 
NGOs) that we believe was critical to the determination by the Security Council to take action 
consistent with the terms of the World Summit  document (paragraph 139). The great  enabler of the 
action against Libya was the power of legitimacy that is now accorded to R2P.
Sceptics can respond by arguing that bolstering the principle of R2P is a relatively low cost 
policy commitment. The argument  presented in this article suggests two rejoinders to this critique. 
First, pragmatic caution is frequently the preferred position taken by the majority of states when a 
humanitarian catastrophe is happening. Noise matters in coalition-building; over Libya, Australia 
made a noise. Second, while it  has not featured in our discussion above, it is noteworthy that  Canada - 
the other middle power that  has championed R2P – has distanced itself from the doctrine under the 
Harper government.
An important legacy of the Libyan intervention for Australia will be the regional fall-out  in its 
own region. The Australian government  has a good record at  contributing to the non-coercive 
dimensions of the responsibility to protect – supporting preventive strategies as well as providing 
assistance to those countries which are at risk of experiencing an atrocity crime. Yet by mobilising its 
normative power behind a high profile pillar three intervention, the government  and its agencies will 
now need to engage in a new round of conceptual diplomacy that reassures neighbouring countries 
that R2P is not a new acronym for an older practice of western state military intervention. At the same 
time, as Libya shows, the cry for intervention for protection will be made, again and again, by those 
peoples who are confronting state terror. When it  is too late for prevention or assistance, the 
applicability of force for humanitarian purposes now commands a degree of legitimacy that was 
absent during the 1990s - a transformation that Australian foreign policy has helped to bring about.
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Notes
1. R2P is of course much wider in scope than the kinds of muscular interventionism identified during 
the 1980s. The current UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, helpfully characterises a ‘three pillar’ 
approach to promoting and implementing R2P. Pillar one refers to the protection responsibilities of 
sovereign states; pillar two refers to international assistance and capacity-building; pillar three relates 
to timely and decisive international responses to actual and potential atrocity crimes. It was the fact of 
Libya’s failure to uphold its pillar one responsibilities that triggered the call for international action 
(hence the pillar three focus of this article).
2. Chesterman refers to the legal implications of Libya as being ‘interesting but not exactly ground-
breaking’ (p.2)
3. Holzgrefe defines ‘humanitarian intervention’ as ‘the threat or use of force across state borders by a 
state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the 
states within whose territory force is applied’ (2003 p.18). It is commonplace to make the absence of 
consent a defining marker of humanitarian intervention – although the meaning of consent is seldom 
reducible to an either/or framing.
4. Weber’s concept of ideological innovator has clear parallels with the constructivist notion of norm 
entrepreneurs, as pioneered by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).
5. This understanding of how contentious norms operate falls far short of what Risse et al (1999) 
would call ‘rule consistent’ behaviour. For an account of the status of R2P as a norm, see Bellamy 
(2010b).
6. Details on this case are in Jess Gifkins PhD thesis, University of Queensland.
7. This data has been compiled from Security Council records. See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/
resguide/scact.htm>
8. BRIC is the conventional way of referring to Brazil, Russia, India and China.
9. As advocated by ICISS 2001.
10. The BRIC became the BRICS after South Africa was invited to join in 2011.  South Africa voted 
for the Resolution despite the AU being opposed to any ‘any foreign military intervention’.
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